External Objects and Consciousness-Only

By : Kang Wang

Page No: 67-106

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the concept of the “perceptual object” (ālambana) within the Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra. This study contends that the conceptions of perceptual objects evolved from Sectarian to Mahāyāna Buddhism through sustained debate and exchange. The Sarvāstivāda defines “existence” by the presence or absence of perception (*buddhi), which supports its claim that “the three periods of time exist (asti).” To refine their epistemology and theory of direct (pratyakṣa) perception, the Sarvāstivādins introduced “simultaneous causality” (sahabhū-hetu) and the physical agglomeration of atoms (*saṃcaya). In contrast, the Sautrāntika advocated the doctrine of mind without a perceptual object, upon which the theory of the pursuant element (anudhātu) was proposed, along with further development of the theories of consciousness arising with representational form (ākāra) and “selfcognition” (sva-saṃvedana). By rejecting the real existence of external objects and asserting internal consciousness as the objectcondition (ālambana-pratyaya), Yogācāra supports the “consciousness-only” (vijñaptimātra) doctrine, which denies external objects. In Yogācāra, the “consciousness-only without image” view holds that consciousness is an “unreal discrimination” (abhūtaparikalpa) of the other-dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva), with all manifestations forming the external object of the pervasively fabricated nature (parikalpita-svabhāva); in contrast, the “consciousness-only with image” interpretation holds that the internal object corresponds to the other-dependent nature, while the external object is identified with the pervasively fabricated nature.

Author
Kang Wang: Ph. D. of University of Kelaniya of Sri Lanka, the Leader of Research of the English Base for Buddhist Exchange (EBBE).